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THE UNION'S DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION - FACT OR FICTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The collective bargaining system is based on the subordina-
tion of the interests of the individual employees to the collec-
tive interests of all members of the bargaining unit.' The Na-
tional Labor Relations Act has given the unions broad author-
ity in negotiating and administering collective bargaining
agreements. 2 However, the courts early recognized that the
employee needs individual protection to counter this broad
union authority. The doctrine of the union's duty of fair repre-
sentation resulted.
Although the union's duty of fair representation was origi-
nally a judicially created doctrine, it was stqbsequently em-
braced by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 3 Since
jurisdiction over union activity is concurrent, no election of
remedies is required and the union's breach of its duty of fair
representation can result in suits in more than one forum.'
Thus, today's aggrieved employee may either file a complaint
with the NLRB or sue in state or federal court.
The duty of fair representation first evolved in the context
of racial discrimination,5 but the courts extended it to all
phases of the collective bargaining process6 and to such varied
circumstances as plant mergers and retirement benefits.' But
despite its broad scope in theory, the duty has often been more
fiction than fact. In practice, the courts have balanced the
necessity for individual protection from unfair union treatment
against the need for union discretion within the collective bar-
gaining system and have traditionally given greater weight to
1. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
2. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
3. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962). See 386 U.S. at 182;
Bartels v. Lithographers' Union No. One-P, 306 F. Supp. 1266 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
4. See Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: A Survey of the Contemporary
Framework and a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the Employee, 8 SuFFOLK U.
L. REV. 1096, 1131-41 (1974); (BNA), THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 743 (C. Morris ed.
1971).
5. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
6. See Price v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 457 F.2d 605 (3rd Cir. 1972); Truck Drivers
& Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
7. See Nedd v. UMW, 400 F.2d 103 (3rd Cir. 1968).
COMMENTS
the need for union discretion.' As a result, only flagrantly un-
fair behavior by unions has resulted in recovery for employees
However, this conservative judicial application of the fair rep-
resentation doctrine has now begun gradually to change. Both
the United States Supreme Court and the Wisconsin court now
recognize the necessity for protecting the workers' precarious
position between the two giants of labor and management and
have recently moved in the direction of establishing a negli-
gence standard to determine breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation.'9 This comment will examine these recent develop-
ments in the judicial interpretation of the duty of fair represen-
tation.
I. SOURCES OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act establishes
that the union is the exclusive representative for all employees
within the bargaining unit, not just those voting for that partic-
ular labor organization."' As a result, a minority of workers may
be antagonistic to their bargaining agent. Conversely, the
union may disfavor some of the workers which it represents and
may be tempted to represent them inadequately.
The entire system of collective bargaining is based on the
subordination of the interests of the individual employee to the
collective interests of all members of the bargaining unit. For
example, the federal labor statutes vest the union with broad
authority to negotiate and administer collective bargaining
agreements while prohibiting the individual from bargaining
for himself. 2
The union's broad and pervasive statutory authority is not
8. See Note, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEx.
L. REv. 1119, 1120 (1973).
9. See Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: A Survey of the Contemporary
Framework and a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the Employee, 8 SUFFOLK U.
L. REv. 1096 (1974).
10. See text accompanying notes 79-87, infra.
11. The National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) provides
in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by a majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment. ...
12. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970); 386 U.S. at 182.
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countered by any statutory protections for the individual rights
of employees. Thus, the federal labor statutes place the indi-
vidual worker in a precarious position, a position which became
more perilous as the labor unions gained power and became less
responsive to the needs of individual employees.'" The courts
recognized that these statutes left the individual worker with-
out recourse against unfair union representation and filled the
void by interpreting them to imply a duty of fair representation
to protect individual rights.
The Supreme Court first recognized the union's duty of fair
representation in the 1944 case of Steele v. Louisville & Nash-
ville Railroad.14 The Alabama Supreme Court had ruled that
no remedy existed against a union guilty of racial discrimina-
tion. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, finding that a fair
interpretation of the statutory language of the Railway Labor
Act would require the union to "represent non-union or minor-
ity union members of the craft without hostile discrimination,
fairly, impartially, and in good faith."'5 In a companion case,
the Supreme Court interpreted the National Labor Relations
Act similarly to require a duty of fair representation.'" The
Court thus subjected all unions covered by the federal labor
statutes to the judicially defined duty of fair representation
and gave the employee a judicial remedy for any unfair partial
or bad faith union conduct.
Eighteen years after the Supreme Court recognized a judi-
cial remedy for unfair representation, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board recognized a parallel administrative remedy. In
Miranda Fuel Co.'7 the Board ruled that unfair representation
falls within the prohibitions of section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act.' 8 According to the Board, section 7 "gives em-
ployees the right to be free from unfair or irrelevant or invidious
treatment by their exclusive bargaining agent in matters af-
fecting their employment."' 9 Because section 8(b)(1)(a) makes
13. See Note, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEx.
L. REv. 1119, 1178 (1973).
14. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
15. Id. at 204.
16. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
17. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds, 326 F.2d 172
(2d Cir. 1963).




a section 7 violation an unfair labor practice, Miranda made
unfair representation by the union an unfair labor practice.
Thus, today's aggrieved employee may seek a remedy for
unfair representation either through an administrative pro-
ceeding before the National Labor Relations Board, or through
a suit in state or federal court. In either case the source of the
remedy is not protective legislation, but rather judicial recogni-
tion of the need for some protection of individual rights within
the collective bargaining system.
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION
The fair representation doctrine began as a response to the
union's authority over minority members of the unit. The early
cases establishing the duty stressed the significance of the
union's power of exclusive representation. The Steele decision
was based on the "principle of general application that the
exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves
the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in
their interest and behalf .... ,,2" Because the labor statutes
vest a union with power over minority members, the Court
required that this power be responsibly exercised.
Following Steele, the Court promptly broadened the basis
for the fair representation doctrine from a concern for fairness
to minority members of the unit to a more general recognition
that the federal labor statutes cannot sanction discrimination
and unfair treatment against any member of society. In 1952
the Supreme Court decided Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
v. Howard,2' in which a union discriminated against black train
porters who were not members of that particular union. The
union argued that its duty extended only to members of the
Brotherhood and consequently, its statutory bargaining power
could legitimately be exercised so as to abolish the jobs of these
black train porters. The Court rejected this narrow construc-
tion of the fair representation doctrine, and ruled that unions
cannot use "their position and power to destroy colored
worker's jobs in order to bestow them on white workers. And
courts can protect those threatened by such an unlawful use of
20. 323 U.S. at 198.
21. 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
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power granted by a federal act."22
The Supreme Court's expansion of the justification for the
duty of fair representation was accompanied by a broadening
of the application of the rule. The duty was first recognized in
the context of racial discrimination, 23 but in 1953 in Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman,24 the Supreme Court applied the fair represen-
tation doctrine to a dispute over seniority credit given to new
employees for time spent in the military, and restated the fair
representation doctrine as a duty of "complete loyalty to, the
interests of all whom [the union] represents. ' '241-
The significance of the Huff man decision is two-fold: First,
the Court applied an old rule in a new factual setting. Pre-
viously the Court had spoken in negative terms restraining the
union from certain types of behavior, but Huffman expressed
the duty in terms of affirmative loyalty.25 Second, the Huffman
decision imposed a far-reaching limitation on the duty. The
Court ruled that "[a] wide range of reasonableness . . . in
serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good
faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion"
is required. 2 Thus, although Huffman expanded the duty be-
yond the racial discrimination context, it established the "wide
range of reasonableness" limitation. This limitation reap-
peared in later years2l and provided a strong counterbalance to
the gradually expanding fair representation doctrine.
The increase in the power of the unions in the later fifties
resulted in a recognition by the Supreme Court in Conley v.
Gibson28 of the need for further expansion of the fair represen-
tation doctrine. In that case, the petitioners were wrongfully
discharged blacks who had been refused union aid in preparing
their grievances. The union contended that its previously es-
tablished duty to refrain from discriminatory conduct ended
with the making of the agreement between union and em-
ployer. In rejecting this argument, the Court established the
rule that "[t]he bargaining representative can no more un-
22. Id. at 774.
23. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
24. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
24.1. Id. at 338.
25. Id. at 330.
26. Id. at 338.
27. See text accompanying notes 35-37, infra.
28. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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fairly discriminate in carrying out [the grievance process]
than it can in negotiating a collective agreement. ' 29 As a result
of Conley, courts applied the duty of fair representation to all
phases of labor relations °.3 However, they applied a more rigor-
ous standard at the negotiation stage,31 thus recognizing the
need for union discretion in the bargaining process. Conley
established the existence of the duty of fair representation of
post-negotiation stages. Later courts made the standard even
more strict at these stages. 2
Conley also introduced a due process analogy in fair repre-
sentation cases. According to the Court, "[a] contract may be
fair and impartial on its face yet administered in such a way,
with the active or tacit consent of the union, as to be flagrantly
discriminatory against some members of the bargaining
unit. '33 This analysis parallels constitutional due process anal-
ysis as applied to criminal statutes, which requires that the
enforcement as well as the language of the statute be non-
discriminatory. 4 In a labor context this analogy results in
examination of actual enforcement and impact rather than a
cursory glance at the language of a union contract. Therefore,
Conley requires fair representation in substance, not just in
form.
In the early sixties, the Supreme Court's concern for balanc-
ing union power with protection of individual workers changed
to a concern that too great a protection of individual rights
would upset the collective bargaining system. This new con-
cern was reflected in Humphrey v. Moore35 where the Court
emphasized the importance of giving the union discretion in
the implementation of the grievance process: "Just as a union
must be free to sift out wholly frivolous grievances which would
only clog the grievance process, so it must be free to take a
position on not so frivolous disputes."" Based on this reason-
29. Id. at 46.
30. See Note, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEx.
L. REv. 1119, 1120 (1973).
31. Id.
32. See generally Blumrosen, Union-Management Agreements Which Harm
Others, 10 J. PuB. L. 345 (1961).
33. 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957).
34. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
35. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
36. Id. at 349.
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ing, the Court in Humphrey refused to provide a judicial rem-
edy for the employee claiming inadequate representation of his
grievance by the union. Lower courts also adopted this ration-
ale for restricting the judicial remedies available to inade-
quately represented employees. 7 By the mid-sixties, the
union's duty of fair representation had become more fiction
than fact.
However, in 1967, the Supreme Court handed down the
landmark decision of Vaca v. Sipes,38 which qualified the prin-
ciple of union discretion. In Vaca the union refused to take to
arbitration an employee's claim that his employer had dis-
charged him in violation of the labor agreement then in force.
The employee then sued the union for breaching its duty of fair
representation. The Court first restated the old maxim that an
employee does not have "an absolute right to have his griev-
ance taken to arbitration regardless of the provisions of the
applicable collective bargaining agreement,"39 but then ruled
that a union can neither ignore an employee's meritorious
grievance nor process the grievance perfunctorily.
Vaca suggested the beginning of a new approach to the
union's duty of fair representation. It recognized the necessity
for union flexibility in bargaining situations but balanced this
concern against the employee's need for a remedy from abuse
of union power. The Court created a remedy with substance by
explicitly setting the standard by which union conduct is mea-
sured. The Court ruled, "[a] breach of the statutory duty of
fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward
a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, or in bad faith."4 This standard broadened the
scope of the fair representation doctrine which had originally
been limited to discriminatory and bad faith conduct. But al-
though Vaca extended the proscription to "arbitrary" conduct,
this nonspecific term created interpretational problems for the
lower courts.
While universally recognizing that the use of the term
"arbitrary" expanded the fair representation standard, the
37. See, e.g., Smith v. DCA Food Industries, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 863 (D. Md. 1967);
Berry v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 319 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
38. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
39. Id. at 191.
40. Id. at 190.
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lower courts differed in interpreting the extent of the expan-
sion. Some interpreted the three-pronged proscription of arbi-
trary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct as separate and in-
dependent tests.4 For example, according to the Sixth Circuit,
"[e]ach of these requirements represents a distinct and sepa-
rate obligation, the breach of which may constitute the basis
for civil action. ' 4" However, decisions construing the Vaca
standard as three independent tests were countered by a line
of cases which continued to insist upon a showing of bad faith
in every case." These courts refused to see Vaca as a move in
the direction of prohibiting negligent union representation, but
held that the union must be guilty of some purposefully unfair
act.
The conflicting interpretations of Vaca resulted in opposite
results in factually similar cases. Some courts held unions to
account for the failure to provide adequate procedural safe-
guards for employees." Lack of adequate notice to a union
member of the attempts to arbitrate a grievance could result
in a finding of breach of the union's duty of fair representa-
tion.4 5 Other courts required proof of the defendant union's bad
faith. " Bad faith requires some degree of intent. Obviously, the
addition of a mens rea requirement substantially changed the
probability of successful prosecution of the charge. As a result,
courts requiring proof of intent rarely found a breach of the
duty of fair representation,47 despite the Supreme Court's new
definition of the standard in Vaca.
IV. RECENT SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FAIR
REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE
After four years of uncertainty created by the Vaca decision,
the Supreme Court in 1971 handed down Motor Coach Em-
ployees v. Lockridge.45 The plaintiff in Lockridge sought dam-
41. See Ruzicka v. Gen. Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
42. 523 F.2d at 310, citing Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1974). See
also De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Traabaiadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
43. See cases cited at 44 FORDHAM L. Rav. 1062 n.15 (1976).
44. Id. at 1067.
45. Id. at 1066.
46. Id. at 1062 n.15.
47. Id.
48. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
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ages from the union for its part in causing his discharge pur-
suant to the union security clause in the collective bargaining
agreement. This clause required as a condition of employment
that Lockridge be a member of the union, but the union wrong-
fully construed it to require membership in good standing. As
a result, the union caused the employer to discharge him be-
cause of his one month delinquency in payment of dues.
Although decided on other grounds, 49 Lockridge referred to
the standard by which a duty of fair representation would be
judged: "There must be 'substantial evidence of fraud, deceit-
ful action or dishonest conduct'."5 This requirement, taken
from Humphrey v. Moore,5" by its terms appears substantially
more restrictive than the Vaca standard of "arbitrary, discrim-
inatory, or bad faith" conduct. Nevertheless, since the
Lockridge Court has quoted both the Humphrey and the Vaca
standard, the Court may not have intended to retreat com-
pletely from the Vaca expansion of the fair representation stan-
dard.
However, Lockridge provided some indication of a retreat
from the Vaca decision. For instance, in its discussion of the
justifications for concurrent jurisdiction by both the National
Labor Relations Board and the courts in fair representation
suits, the Court stated that, "the fact that the doctrine . . .
carries with it the need to adduce substantial evidence of dis-
crimination that is intentional, severe, and unrelated to legiti-
mate union objectives ensures that the risk of conflict with the
general congressional policy favoring expert, centralized ad-
ministration, and remedial action is tolerably slight. 52 The
Court cited Vaca for this proposition, even though Vaca does
not require such a severe limitation on fair representation suits.
Thus, Lockridge appeared to transform the broad Vaca stan-
dard of arbitrary conduct into a rigid and narrow standard of
intentional and severe union conduct. Lockridge cast doubt on
lower court interpretations of Vaca which established a union's
49. The Court ruled that the case turned on a construction of the applicable union
security clause which would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board.
50. 403 U.S. at 299.
51. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
52. 403 U.S. at 301.
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duty to refrain from grossly negligent representation of its
members.53
Finally, in 1976, the Supreme Court handed down Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight,54 which clarifies the Vaca standard. The
case involved a claim that the union's breach of the duty of fair
representation tainted the grievance-arbitration procedures
upholding the discharge of plaintiff employees. The Court
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, stating that "enforcement of the
finality provision where the arbitrator has erred is conditioned
upon the union's having satisfied its statutory duty fairly to
represent the employee in connection with the arbitration pro-
ceedings."55
The Hines Court based its ruling in favor of the employees
on an historical analysis of the development of the union's duty
of fair representation. Significantly, the Court emphasized the
broad language in Vaca and partially clarified the Vaca stan-
dard by suggesting the boundaries of permissible union con-
duct. Although the Court specifically allowed "mere errors in
judgment," unions will not be permitted to leave employees
"without jobs and without a fair opportunity to secure an ade-
quate remedy."5
Hines demonstrated less deference to the collective bargain-
ing process and more concern for protection of individual work-
ers than previous fair representation cases. The Court applied
a due process type of analysis to support a decision in favor of
the employee. Procedural due process requires notice and an
opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the case.57 Similarly,
the Hines Court found that redress beyond the grievance arbi-
tration procedures was appropriate because of the substantial
damage sustained by the employee. The Court mandated "an
adequate mechanism to secure individual redress for damaging
failure of the employer to abide by the contract."5 Substantial
deprivation was present in both Vaca and Hines since both
cases involved an employee discharge and each case permitted
redress for the employee. In accord with the due process con-
53. See cases cited at note 42, supra.
54. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
55. Id. at 571.
56. Id.
57. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
58. 424 U.S. at 571 (emphasis added).
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cept of "fundamental fairness," the Hines Court fashioned its
rule to prevent "error and injustice of the grossest sort." 59
"[E]rror and injustice of the grossest sort," in the words
of the Hines Court, has often resulted when the individual
employee is pitted against the economic giants of big business
and big labor. The Hines Court implicitly recognized that all
too frequently the fair representation doctrine offered scant
protection for individual workers. Building on the landmark
case of Vaca, Hines established a stricter standard of conduct
in representing union members. Vaca proscribed arbitrary con-
duct, and Hines elaborated on that rule by imposing on the
union the obligations of due process of law. In addition, by
upholding a finding of breach of the duty of fair representation
based on arbitrary union conduct, Hines supported those lower
courts which have found a breach of the fair representation
duty even in the absence of any bad faith.
The Hines decision follows naturally from the language in
Vaca. Both decisions suggest the possibility that unions may
be required to refrain from mere negligence in the representa-
tion of their members. In view of Hines, the earlier Lockridge
decision is even more difficult to assess. However, the language
in Lockridge suggesting that the Vaca standard requires bad
faith was dicta. Since the Hines Court ignored completely the
summary interpretation of Vaca in Lockridge, Lockridge is
simply not controlling.
V. THE FAIR REPRESENTATION DOCTRINE IN THE WISCONSIN
COURTS
In contrast to the Supreme Court in Hines, the Seventh
Circuit and the Wisconsin district courts have taken a narrow
view of the union's duty of fair representation." A recent exam-
ple of Seventh Circuit reasoning on the union's duty of fair
representation is found in Williams v. General Foods Corp."1
There the court held that the union's failure to protect female
employees from discriminatory company policies was insuffi-
59. Id.
60. See Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972); Moore v.
Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972); Dwyer v. Climatrol Indus. Inc., 403 F.
Supp. 683 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Mikelson v. Wis. Bridge & Iron Co., 359 F. Supp. 444
(W.D. Wis. 1973); Gottschling v. Square D Co., 301 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
61. 492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1974).
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cient to establish a breach of the fair representation duty. To
justify this conclusion the court relied on the Second Circuit
rule that "[s]omething akin to factual malice is necessary to
establish a breach of the duty of fair representation. '6 2 How-
ever, it should be noted that Williams was decided after
Lockridge, and thus its precedential value is limited.
In contrast to the conservative approach adopted thus far
by the Seventh Circuit courts, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has shown a willingness to scrutinize closely an employee's
complaint against the union. The best example of this position
is Clark v. Hein- Werner Corp.63 In this case the interests of two
groups of empoyees within the bargaining unit were diametri-
cally opposed. The union advocated the cause of one group in
the arbitration, and the other group sued the union for a breach
of the fair representation doctrine.
The Wisconsin court admitted that "'[the law upon this
subject is still in a state of flux,' "64 but adopted a broad stan-
dard labeled by commentators as the "fiduciary duty of fair
representation." The Court applied this standard to the cir-
cumstances in Clark and found that "as a matter of law there
has been no fair representation . . . even though, in choosing
the cause of which group to espouse, the union acts completely
objectively and with the best of motives. The old adage, that
one cannot serve two masters, is particularly applicable to such
a situation.""
This fiduciary standard which the Wisconsin court applied
in 1959, is arguably stricter than the Supreme Court's 1964
standard in Vaca. Under the Vaca standard, the defendant
union in Clark could have absolved itself of liability by showing
the objective reasons for its decision to represent one faction
over the other, but it could not do so under the Clark rationale.
In Clark the Court concluded that the group of employees
whose cause was not supported by the union should be allowed
to intervene in the arbitration proceeding. The court reasoned
62. Id. at 405, quoting Jackson v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 457 F.2d 202, 204 (2nd
Cir. 1972).
63. 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), rehearing denied, 8 Wis. 2d 277, 100
N.W.2d 317 (1960).
64. Id. at 270, 99 N.W.2d at 135, quoting Donato v. Am. Locomotive Co., 283 App.
Div. 410, 415, 127 N.Y.S.2d 709, 714, aff'd, 306 N.Y. 966, 120 N.E.2d 227 (1954).
65. 8 Wis. 2d at 272, 99 N.W.2d at 137.
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that "where the substantial interests of the representative are
not necessarily or even probably the same as those he purports
to represent, due process militates vigorously against giving the
decision effect upon them." 6 Thus, as early as 1959, the Wis-
consin court used a due process analysis to decide a fair repre-
sentation case.
Since the United States Supreme Court in Conley and in
Hines also applied a due process type of analogy, it is likely
that the Wisconsin court will continue to rely on the rationale
of Clark. The Clark court based its due process analysis on the
fact that seniority rights are "valuable property right[s]," 7
and found the requisite state action in a statute making it "an
unfair labor practice not to carry out the arbitration clause of
a collective-bargaining contract. 6 8 Therefore, due process re-
quires an opportunity for a hearing untainted by the union's
misconduct. Employees seeking to rely on Clark or Hines
should be successful in cases involving substantial depriva-
tions. Since the procedural requirements of due process vary
with the gravity of the deprivation, greater safeguards should
be required in discharge or seniority cases than in cases of less
serious injury. Even though the requisite state action is not
found in every case, the courts should follow the example of
Hines, and apply a standard patterned on due process law.
The Wisconsin court's deference to the individual rights of
employees was balanced by a recognition of the need to com-
promise. In a case decided the year after Clark, Fray v. Meat
Cutters Workmen Local 248,69 the Court emphasized the
union's need for discretion in determining whether to present
an employee's grievance: "In certain cases for the greater good
of the members as a whole, some individual rights may have
to be compromised."7 Although Fray recognized that two in-
terests are at odds in any claim by an employee against his
union, the Court did not substantially change its earlier recog-
nition that the union has a duty to protect individual rights.
The Wisconsin court's progressive attitude toward the duty
of fair representation is shown again in the 1961 case of
66. Id. at 274, 99 N.W.2d at 138.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N.W.2d 782 (1960).
70. Id. at 641, 101 N.W.2d at 787.
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O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co. 71 The employees in this case
were dissatisfied with their union's bargain regarding an inte-
grated seniority list following a plant merger. The court upheld
the union's conduct concluding that "hardships suffered by
some were not the result of arbitrary or discriminatory treat-
ment by respondents but were inherent in the very circumstan-
ces from which the problem arose."72 But the dicta in the
O'Donnell decision is more important than the conclusion. The
case was decided six years before Vaca, but anticipated the
Supreme Court's reasoning in stating that "[a]ctually, appel-
lants make no charge in their argument here of bad faith, arbi-
trary, discriminatory, or capricious conduct on the part of res-
pondents . . . -13 At a time when other courts required a hos-
tile motive, the Wisconsin court implied that arbitrary or ca-
pricious conduct could be the basis for a breach of the duty of
fair representation.
The Wisconsin court's liberal construction of the fair repre-
sentation standard was again evident in the 1975 decision of
Mahnke v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission.74
Mahnke involved a union's refusal to arbitrate an employee's
discharge. This refusal was based solely on economic reasons,
but the court, nevertheless, found an insufficient basis for the
decision not to arbitrate. The standard established by the court
required that "such [a] decision should take into account at
least the monetary value of his claim, the effect of the breach
on the employee and the likelihood of success in arbitration."' 5
The Wisconsin court has extended the duty of fair represen-
tation by giving it specificity. Most courts, including the Su-
preme Court, have set broad standards which are ineffective in
many concrete cases.76 In contrast, the Wisconsin court is will-
ing to put teeth into general standards by demanding that the
union take specific affirmative actions to fulfill its duty to the
employee.
71. 12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W.2d 484 (1961).
72. Id. at 502, 107 N.W.2d at 487.
73. Id.
74. 66 Wis. 2d 524, 225 N.W.2d 617 (1975).
75. Id. at 534, 225 N.W.2d at 626.
76. See text accompanying notes 38-47, supra.
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VI. THE REMAINING QUESTION - Is COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE
ENOUGH To BREACH THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION?
Most courts agree that mere negligence on the part of the
union does not establish a breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion.7 7 However, some courts have come close to overturning
this rule. The Fourth Circuit in Griffin v. Automobile Workers
upheld a twelve thousand dollar verdict against a union on the
grounds that "[w]ithout any hostile motive of discrimination
and in complete good faith, a union may nevertheless pursue a
course of action or inaction that is so unreasonable and arbi-
trary as to constitute a violation .... ,,78 The facts of Griffin
reveal nothing more serious than the negligent handling of an
employee's grievance concerning his discharge for fighting with
a supervisor. The union first filed the employee's grievance
with the supervisor who had been involved in the fight. Accord-
ing to the court, the grievance should have been filed with the
depot manager.
The Sixth Circuit has been even more explicit in recogniz-
ing that negligent union acts may breach the duty of fair repre-
sentation. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp.79 involved a union's
failure to file a notice of unadjusted grievance that was neces-
sary to commence arbitration. The court ruled that "[s]uch
negligent handling of the grievance, unrelated as it was to the
merits of Appellant's case, amounts to unfair representation."8
In contrast to the willingness of the Fourth and Sixth Cir-
cuits to find negligent breach of the duty, the Seventh Circuit
has followed the Third Circuit and unequivocally ruled that
"proof that the union may have acted negligently or exercised
poor judgment is not enough to support a claim of unfair repre-
sentation."81 These courts set a standard of care for unions
which is substantially lower than the common law negligence
standard of reasonably prudent conduct, and require "the
plaintiff [to] show that the Union's conduct was intentional,
invidious and directed at that particular employee."" Much is
77. See (BNA), THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 153 (C. Morris ed. 1972).
78. 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972).
79. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
80. Id. at 310.
81. Cannon v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 1975), quoting
Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1970).
82. 524 F.2d at 293.
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required of the plaintiff and little of the union. Even grossly
negligent union conduct is allowed.
In contrast to the federal courts, the Wisconsin court has set
strict standards of employee representation. When the evolu-
tion of the doctrine of fair representation was still in its early
stages, this court recognized the "possibility of an action by an
injured member of a union against the union... arising out
of the negligence of union officers or agents in the representa-
tion of the injured member in a grievance against the em-
ployer. ' '8 3
Courts other than the Wisconsin Supreme Court have inti-
mated that a union breach of the duty of fair representation
might be based on negligence. The Ninth Circuit has ruled that
"'the Vaca opinion's repeated reference to "arbitrary" union
conduct reflects a calculated broadening of the fair representa-
tion standard.' "84 But the question remains whether this
"broadening" referred to by the Ninth Circuit is great enough
to cover negligent acts. One recent decision has ruled that con-
duct which would fit under the common law definition of "gross
negligence" is sufficient to show a fair representation breach. 5
In that case, the Oregon Supreme Court established the applic-
able test as "conduct that [is] reckless, irresponsible and ca-
pricious to the extent of being arbitrary." 8 On this basis the
court upheld a jury verdict that the union breached its duty of
fair representation by ordering an employee to stop work when
the work stoppage caused the employee's discharge. The court
held that in exercising bad judgment amounting to gross negli-
gence, the union breached its duty to the employees.
The next step in the judicial expansion of the doctrine of
fair representation for many courts may be to follow the Oregon
court and hold grossly negligent conduct a breach of the duty.
But, since gross negligence has proved difficult to distinguish
from common law negligence," the courts may inevitably adopt
a simple negligence standard requiring unions to exercise rea-
83. Fray v. Meat Cutters Workmen Local 248, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 640, 101 N.W.2d 782,
789 (1960).
84. Beriault v. Local 40, Int'l Long Shoremen's Union, 501 F.2d 258, 265-66 (9th
Cir. 1974), quoting Retana v. Apartment Operators Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1023 n.8
(1972).
85. Wheeler v. Woodworkers, 92 L.R.R.M. 2332, 2336 (Ore. Sup. Ct. 1976).
86. Id.
87. See generally Comment 37 MARQ. L. REv. 334 (1954).
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sonable care in the representation of their members. The recent
Supreme Court ruling in Hines is a step in this direction, and
the Wisconsin court would certainly not hesitate to expand the
rule if confronted with the proper case.
Some commentators have suggested that any expansion of
the union's duty of fair representation should be accompanied
by a distinction between procedural negligence and substan-
tive negligence, and that unions be held to the negligence stan-
dard only in cases of procedural negligence.88 This distinction
in types of negligent union conduct is supported by the view
that in order to give unions full scope to represent their mem-
bers, public policy may require that they be insulated from
liability for the negligent determination of discretionary mat-
ters. 9 In contrast, the rights of all the members of the collective
bargaining unit will not be strengthened by allowing a union
to escape liability for its negligent failure to follow required
procedure.
A broad duty of fair representation may necessarily evolve
in cases of procedural negligence, since the need for a stricter
standard for union behavior is great and few countervailing
reasons for broad union discretion exist. However, the standard
which governs cases involving substantive negligence in the
exercise of union discretion are more difficult to assess. This
writer does not believe that the simple solution of insulating
the unions from attack for substantive negligence is necessarily
the best solution. The need to afford an actor with discretion
in the exercise of his duties has not precluded the use of a
negligence standard in other areas of tort law."°
The federal labor statutes have placed the individual em-
ployee in a precarious and often unprotected position between
the economic giants of labor and management. The courts have
recognized the necessity for countering the union's broad statu-
tory power with some protection for individual rights by impos-
ing on the union a duty to fairly represent the employees. This
duty, like most others, should be judged by a simple negligence
standard. The recent federal and state decisions should result
88. See, e.g., 44 FORDHAN L. REv. 1062 (1976).
89. Id. at 1067.
90. For example, the negligence standard has traditionally been applied to the
judgment calls of physicians and attorneys. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS,
(4th ed. 1971) § 32 at 161-66.
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in a broader and more just application of the fair representa-
tion doctrine.
GRACE SHAVER FIGG
